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JONATHAN T. CAIN*

Routes and Roadblocks: State
Controls on Hazardous Waste
Imports"
INTRODUCTION

In an effort to conserve their chemical waste' disposal capacity and
reduce environmental and health risks associated with hazardous waste
disposal, some states have attempted to restrict their disposal facilities to
those wastes generated by industry located within the state.2 The federal
courts, however, have overturned these restrictions3 in decisions based
upon the commerce clause of the Constitution.' The Supreme Court has
*Research Associate with the law firm of Nossaman, Guthner, Knox and Elliott, Washington,
D.C.
tThe author wishes to acknowledge the financial support provided by the Appalachian Regional
Commission and the Environmental Law Institute for the research and writing of this article.
1. Hazardous waste is defined, for the purposes of this discussion, as
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration,
or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976). Solid waste is defined as
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, and other discarded material,
including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial,
commercial, mining and agricultural olirations, and from community activities, but does
not include [domestic sewage or discharges authorized under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act or the Atomic Energy Act].
42 U.S.C. §6903(27) (1976). Hazardous wastes are listed by the EPA Administrator by rules
promulgated under authority of Section 3001 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1976). The regulations are published at 40 C.F.R. § 261 (1982).
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1701 (Michie Supp. 1981); 1973 La. Acts 78, (repealed
and replaced by The Louisiana Environmental Affairs Act, LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1051-1150
(West Supp. 1983)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2253 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147A, B, C & D (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:119-1110 (West 1979), repealed by L. 1981,
c. 78, § 1 (West Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2764 (West 1973), repealed by L.
1981, c. 322, § 17 (West Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.9-6 (1979)(refuse imports prohibited)(hazardous waste managed under a licensing statute, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.1-1 to -21
(1979)).
3. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871
(10th Cir. 1980). See Washington St. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp.
928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983)
(radioactive waste import ban unconstitutional under commerce clause and supremacy clause). But
see Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated, 455 U.S. 931 (1982)
(municipal ordinance monopolizing garbage collection only incidentally affects interstate commerce
and is constitutional).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, "The Congress shall have the power to... regulate commerce
... among the several states."
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repeatedly held that a state is without the power to prevent privately
owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce
because the state wishes to isolate itself from the national economy or
because the goods are needed by the people of the state. 5 The Court has
rejected the argument that hazardous waste import restrictions are a legitimate means by which states may reduce risks to public health and
safety arising in the disposal of hazardous materials.
Despite these rulings, however, there are several sound policy reasons
why hazardous waste import restrictions should be allowed: they will
help to mitigate public opposition to new hazardous waste facilities 6 by
assuring that the benefits of a facility will accrue to those bearing the
risk; they will encourage the development of more facilities serving a
localized market, thereby expanding the total national pool of approved
facilities and reducing the incentive for illegal disposal;7 and they may
help contain the costs of waste disposal by encouraging development of
more facilities and more efficient use of existing disposal capacity.8
5. Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1928). See infra text accompanying
notes 57-60. Commerce may be defined as "the commercial intercourse between nations, and the
parts of nations." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,189-90 (1824). To be covered by the
commerce clause, hazardous waste must first be an article of commercial intercourse. Although
waste is not traditionally so considered, the situation is changing. One of the purposes of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 is to promote trade in waste materials. 42 U.S.C. § 6951
(1976).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 26-31. See also COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, HOW TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE-A SERIOUS QUESTION
THAT NEEDS TO BE RESOLVED (1978) (reviews growing effectiveness of public opposition to
hazardous waste facility siting decisions); Wolf, Public Opposition to Hazardous Waste Sites: The
Self-Defeating Approach to National Hazardous Waste Control Under Subtitle C of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 463 (1980).
7. Improper, negligent and reckless hazardous waste disposal, carried out in many cases by
"midnight dumpers," was recognized as one of the principal obstacles to regulating hazardous waste
disposal. House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, Report to Accompany H.R. 7020, H.R.
Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
6119-30 [hereinafter cited as House Report on 7020]. Some of the problems involved in such
midnight dumping are vividly illustrated in a 1979 Philadelphia Inquirer series, Poison at Our
Doorsteps, Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 23, 1979, at 1,col. 1.Additional examples are given in
House Report on 7020 supra, at 18-20. Problems with midnight dumping was one of the primary
reasons Congress insisted upon joint liability in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, also known as "Superfund". Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.
2767 (1980) (to be codified as 46 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657). The joint liability provisions of Section
107 and the financial responsibility provisions of Section 108 were designed to ensure that illegal
dumpers or their sources of waste material would be held financially accountable for damages. House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Report to Accompany H.R. 85, H.R. Rep. No. 172,
96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 42-47, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6187-92. See
generally Environmental Law Institute, Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (unpublished report prepared for the Environmental Protection Agency 1981).
8. In the recently fashionable "anti-regulatory" environment, it may appear anomolous to advocate
increased opportunities for regulation as a means to reduce the ultimate costs of hazardous waste
disposal. The difficulty arises when one limits the analysis to a national disposal system comprised
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This article, therefore, explores three means by which states may restrict hazardous waste imports. First, the narrow remaining ground for a
direct, unilateral import restriction is discussed in light of the decisions
in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey9 and lower federal court cases.' 0
Second, the article considers interstate compacts, which are authorized
under the Solid Waste Disposal Act." Finally, state ownership of hazardous waste facilities is discussed with reference to recent Supreme Court
decisions. The analysis concludes that although obstacles exist, state
ownership of hazardous waste facilities provides the best means for states
to impose hazardous waste import restrictions in the near future.
HAZARDOUS WASTES: NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Off-site hazardous waste disposal is a large and growing industry. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has documented increases in the
disposal industry's gross revenues of more than 20 percent per year in
the last half of the 1970s, reaching an estimated $300 million annually
in 1980.12 Each year, American industry generates approximately 41.2
million wet metric tons (WMT) of hazardous waste, and in 1981 over
nine million WMT of such waste were disposed of at sites removed from
the site of generation.13 Moreover, much of this off-site waste disposal
takes place outside the state where the waste was generated. In Maryland,
for example, 20 percent or 50,000 WMT per year of the waste disposed
of already established sites. In such a case, increased regulation by states may have an inflationary
effect. If, however, the problem is viewed as one of siting additional facilities, the real economic
issue emerges. Space to locate sites is a rare commodity eagerly sought after by site developers.
Regulatory measures that will enhance the probable success of disposal facility siting attempts are
a cost-reduction measure increasing the overall economic efficiency of the waste disposal system.
Similar issues have arisen in the siting of other public facilities. See, e.g., Blitch, Airport Noise
and IntergovernmentalConflict: A Case Study in Land Use Parochialism,5 ECOLOGY L. Q. 669
(1976); Deal, The Durham Controversy: Energy Facility Siting and the Land Use Planning and
Control Process, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 437 (1975); Farkas, Overcoming Public Opposition
to the Establishment of New Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 9 CAP. U. L. R. 451 (1980); Joskow
& Yellin, Siting Nuclear Power Plants, I VA J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1980); Susskind &
Cassella, The Dangers of Preemptive Legislation: The Case of LNG Facility Siting in California, 1
ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 9 (1980); Wolpert, Regressive Siting of Public Facilities,
16 NAT. RES. J. 103 (1976); Note, Energy Facility Siting in North Dakota, 52 N.D.L. REV. 703
(1976).
9. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Further discussion of the case may be found in State Embargo of Solid
Waste: Impermissible Isolation or Rational Solution to a Pressing Problem?, 82 DICK. L. REV.
325 (1978).
10. Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980); Washington St. Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
11. 42 U.S.C. §6904(b) (1976)
12. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hazardous Waste Generation and Commercial Hazardous Waste Management Capacity (SW-894), at V-2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as U.S. EPA].
13. Id. at 111-2, 111-6
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of away from the generation site is imported from neighboring states.14
Virginia, on the other hand, lacks any offsite hazardous waste disposal
capability, and must export all wastes not disposed of by the generator
at its plant site. 5
Nationwide, eighty-nine firms, three municipalities, and one quasipublic state agency operate 127 commercial hazardous waste sites. 6 In
addition, thousands of hazardous waste sites have been illegally created
and abandoned, and an unknown number of municipal landfills have been
used for hazardous waste disposal. 1 7 These sites pose immediate or potential environmental or public health threats as a result of wastes contaminating land or surface and ground waters. 8
Disposal of toxic materials in surface impoundments or landfills has
been identified as one of the most significant sources of groundwater
pollution. 9 One survey has revealed more than 25,000 industrial waste
surface impoundments located throughout the country.20 More than 70
percent of these sites are unlined and more than 30 percent contain hazardous wastes. 2' In every state, wastes leaking from disposal sites have
contaminated groundwater supplies with toxic, carcinogenic or otherwise
hazardous chemicals. 22 A House Oversight Subcommittee found that this
14. MARYLAND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, HAZARDOUS WASTE QUANTITIES AND
FACILITIES NEEDS IN MARYLAND: INITIAL ASSESSMENT 1 (Document No. 85486) (1980).
The remainder of Maryland's hazardous waste stream is dominated by materials from the Allied
Steel Co. located in Baltimore. The state owns and operates a landfill site for diversified hazardous
wastes at Sparrow's Point, Md. Id. The Maryland Environmental Service is actively seeking additional
sites to serve both Allied Steel and the general hazardous waste market. Interview with William
Sloan, Secretary of the Maryland Environmental Service, in Annapolis (Jan. 23, 1981).
15. Interview with Wladimir Gulevich, Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, Virginia Department of Health, in Richmond (Jan. 28, 1981). Virginia has not studied future hazardous waste
site needs nor made any plans to acquire sites within the state although Virginia statute authorizes
state ownership and operation of such facilities. VA. CODE §§ 32.1-178(A)( 11),(12) (Michie Supp.
1981). No site permit applications from private parties are pending or are anticipated in the near
future. Telephone interview with Jackie Williams, Solid and Hazardous Waste Division, Virginia
Department of Health, Richmond (Aug. 28, 1981).
16. U.S. EPA, supra note 12, at V-I.
17. Estimates on the total number of such sites vary. In 1979, an EPA financed study placed the
number of hazardous waste sites at over 54,000. Fred C. Hart Associates, Preliminary Assessment
of Clean-Up Costs for National Hazardous Waste Problems, (EPA Contract No. 68-01-5063 1979).
18. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMM.
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., HAZARDOUS WASTE
DISPOSAL I (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL].
19. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Groundwater Protection (SW-886), at 7 (1980).
20. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, CONTAMINATION OF GROUND WATER
BY TOXIC ORGANIC CHEMICALS 9 (1981).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 10. Examples include carbon tetrachloride at 18,700 parts per billion in domestic wells
as a result of waste dumping outside Memphis, Tenn.; the discovery that Niagara Falls residents
were drinking water containing toxic chemicals at levels four times that recommended by EPA as a
minimum safe limit; 54 Long Island public water supply wells serving over 100,000 people contaminated by assorted chemicals; and the discovery of a dump in Charles City, Iowa that was found
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contamination has led to higher rates of miscarriage and birth defects,
respiratory problems, urinary tract disease, cancer, or central nervous
system disorders in surrounding populations.23
Such health and environmental consequences of improper hazardous
waste disposal can be ameliorated only if adequate provisions are made
for properly designed and operated disposal facilities. Yet, the EPA has
estimated that major industrial areas of the country would face significant
regional shortages of suitable commercial hazardous waste disposal capacity in 1981 and beyond. The Great Lakes states, the Northern Plains,
and the Northwest encountered a total deficiency in off-site disposal capacity of more than one million WMT in 1981.24 In theory, excess capacity
in other regions of the country might mitigate the impact of these shortages
to some extent,2 5 but high transportation costs and the possibility of
mishaps in transit make large-scale transfers over long distances an unattractive substitute for adequate local disposal capacity.
Further, without a radical improvement in the success of hazardous
waste facility siting attempts, 26 potential new entrants into the field or
innovative waste treatment technologies are not expected to expand the
available capacity to any significant degree .27Therefore, it is likely that
under the existing circumstances, serious deficiencies in regional hazardto'be polluting groundwater serving 300,000 people wiih arseiic and orthonitroaniline. This is only
a partial listing of the cases in EPA files. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal:Hearings Before
the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1979) (statement of EPA Assistant Administrator Thomas C. Jorling).
23. HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 18, at 15-18. In the Love Canal incident,
studies by the New York State Health Department's Rosewell Park Memorial Institute found miscarriages in women moving into the area rose from 8.5% to 25%. Children born to families closest
to the site suffered birth defects 20% of the time as opposed to 6.8% of the time in removed areas.
Urinary disease incidence increased by a factor of 2.8, and asthma increased by a factor of 3.8.
Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal:Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution
and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 140-61 (1979) (statement of Dr. B. Paigen).
24. U.S. EPA, supra note 12, at IX-4.
25. U.S. EPA, supra note 12, ch. IX.
26. A recent study of hazardous waste facility siting attempts in EPA Regions IV and VI revealed
that only 30% and 50%, respectively, of the permit applications for a hazardous waste facility in
those regions are approved. Public opposition, rather than any technical, economic, or regulatory
compliance problem, is the principal reason for permit denial. D. Davis, P. Reed, & E. Yang,
Assessment of Problems Related to Siting Hazardous Waste Management Facilities in EPA Regions
IV and VI (1980) (unpublished study for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter
cited as Davis].
EPA Region IV is comprised of the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 40 C.F.R. § 1.21(b)(4) (1981). EPA Region VI is
comprised of the states of Arkansas, Louisana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1.21(b)(6) (1981). These states were selected for study because industrial growth in these states,
and therefore the demand for hazardous waste disposal capacity, is expected to grow the fastest of
any region in the country. See generally U.S. EPA, supra note 12.
27. U.S. EPA, supra note 12, at VI-I.
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ous waste disposal capacity can be expected to persist and grow in the
remainder of the decade.28
The Public Opposition Factor
Public opposition is the single most significant factor restricting the
growth of the number of hazardous waste sites.29 Regardless of the quality
of the facility, its environmental controls, or the restrictions imposed upon
its operation, the public today often refuses to accept a hazardous waste
disposal facility near their homes.3 °
Studies of public opposition to the siting of facilities have detected a
number of factors contributing to the public's unwillingness to accept the
new hazards such facilities represent. Included among the reasons for
opposition are a distorted perception of the risk posed by the facility, a
great disparity between the perceived risk and the off-setting benefits the
community would receive from the facility, distrust of government's
competence to ensure safe operation of the facility, and a sense that the
community is powerless to affect the siting decision or its consequences.3 1
Most important among these factors is the high degree of perceived risk
posed by such facilities. When the risk and benefits are dissociated, the
perceived level of risk is much greater, and the public is less willing to
accept any risk, regardless of its real or imagined magnitude.3 2 Conversely, to the extent the affected public perceives a direct relationship
between the risk posed by the facility and some immediate off-setting
community benefit, resistance to siting will be reduced.
State Import Controls
State governments are faced with conflicting forces in managing hazardous waste issues. On one hand, they are faced with growing, successful
public opposition to the siting of new hazardous waste facilities. On the
28. Id.
29. Id. See also supra note 6.
30. The need for new, safe facilities is recognized by the public. A 1980 public opinion survey
conducted by the Council on Environmental Quality found that a majority of respondents endorsed
a new, secure, regularly-inspected hazardous waste facility-but only if it was located over 100
miles from their homes. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, PUBLIC OPINION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 31 (1980).
31. Davis, supra note 26. Chapter II provides a useful review of the corpus of the siting literature,
and Appendix A presents a thorough annotated bibliography.
32. See R. Burt, Resolving Community Conflict in the Nuclear Power Issue: A Report and
Annotated Bibliography (May, 1978) (unpublished report prepared for the U.S. Department of
Energy, Office of Waste Isolation); E. Peele, Community Impacts of Energy Production (June 1,
1979)(prepared for the Sociopolitical Resources Group of the Risk/Impact Panel, Committee on
Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, National Research Council, Oak Ridge National Laboratory); Peele, Mitigating Community Impacts of Energy Development: Some Examplesfor Coal and
Nuclear GeneratingPlants in the U.S., 44 NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY 132 (1979); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (SW 809)(1979).
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other, they are confronted with the likelihood that major industrial segments of their economies will be adversely affected if their state disposal
capacity cannot be conserved or expanded. As a consequence, several
states have attempted to limit access to sites within their borders to those
wastes generated by industry located within the state.33
Theoretically, there are several political and economic reasons to allow
states to restrict the importation of hazardous wastes from outside generators. In a given state, import restrictions would extend the capacity
available for wastes produced by industry located within that state. To
the extent that such production is linked to the availability of waste
disposal services, the maintenance of industrial capacity or the opportunity
to expand industrial production would confer direct off-setting benefits
on the population at risk in the form of increased employment, tax revenues, secondary and supplier growth opportunities, and other similar
advantages. 34 Citizens would not be asked to accept a risk in situations
where the benefits would be conferred upon the distant residents of another
state. With a more direct link between risks and benefits, siting attempts
would have greater chances of success.35 The resulting nationwide increase in disposal capacity would provide a material national benefit in
the form of lower environmental and public health risks from improper
hazardous waste disposal and the consequent cost savings.
In addition, the creation of state import controls would force those
states lacking adequate hazardous waste disposal facilities to develop
them, consequently expanding the nationwide hazardous waste disposal
capacity. The increase in total capacity should create market factors that
will contain the costs of proper waste disposal. Further, with the development of more sites, transportation of wastes over long distances would
be reduced, saving energy and other transportation costs. 36
33. See note 2 supra.
34. Legislators enacting hazardous waste management licensing statutes refer to the relationship
between disposal capacity and economic growth. See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1132(A)(1),(2)
(West Supp. 1983) (chemical industry makes significant contribution to economy of the state and
produces dangerous wastes needing prudent treatment).
35. See note 32 supra.
36. Reduced long-distance transportation also has the benefit of reducing the probability of major
transportation mishaps and the related emergency response, environmental, and public health costs.
The costs of transporting hazardous wastes from the site of generation to one of the approved disposal
sites may run from three to as much as ten times the cost of the disposal itself. E.g., interview with
Robert Stillwell, President of SCA Chemical Services, in Pinewood, S.C. (Jan. 30, 1981); interview
with Richard Cook, Director of Occupational and Environmental Safety, Dupont de Nemours Company, in Richmond, Va. (Jan 28, 1981); interview with Holmes Brown, Energy and Natural Resources
program, National Governors' Association, in Washington, D.C. (Jan 21, 1981). Since most hazardous waste disposal is handled on a competitive bid basis in the private market place, disposal
site operators will not reveal their actual operating costs. Id. Most operators quote prospective
customers composite figures which include a varying ratio of transportation to disposal cost depending
upon the specific waste involved, the disposal process required, transportation risks and liabilities,
and locations of the generator and disposal site. Id.
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Finally, restriction of out-of-state imports may encourage greater economic efficiency in the development of hazardous waste facilities. A state
with the ability to limit waste imports could also agree to accept specified
wastes in exchange for a neighboring state's acceptance of other types
of wastes requiring a different treatment process. Such interstate agreements would foster greater interstate cooperation in all aspects of waste
management. More importantly, they would promote efficient economies
of scale in the development and utilization of specific types of highly
capitalized waste treatment facilities, thereby reducing inefficient levels
of redundancy in the total national hazardous waste management system.
Therefore, the following section will explore the limited remaining
ground for traditional state imposed hazardous waste import controls, as
well as two other potentially more fruitful means by which states may
exercise control over the source of wastes placed in existing or planned
hazardous waste disposal facilities located within their jurisdictions.
NEW JERSEY'S IMPORT CONTROL STRATEGY
In 1973, New Jersey enacted a Waste Control Act 37 authorizing the
New Jersey Commissioner of Environmental Protection to prohibit the
importation of wastes into New Jersey from other states. 38 The statute
was subsequently amended, 39 and rules were promulgated prohibiting the
importation of any wastes destined for New Jersey landfills rather than
for recycling or reclamation.4"
37. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-1 to -10 (West 1979).
38. Under the Act,
[t]he Commissioner shall have the power to formulate and promulgate, and amend
and repeal orders, rules and regulations prohibiting, conditioning and controlling the
incineration or landfill of solid waste and the treatment or disposal of liquid wastes
within the State which originated or were collected outside the territorial limits of the
State.
Id. § 13:11-4(a).
39.The amendment states:
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which originated or was
collected outside the territorial limits of the State . . . until the commissioner shall
determine that such action can be permitted without endangering the public health,
safety and welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the
treatment and disposal of such waste in this state.
Id. § 13:11-10
40. (a) No person shall bring into this State, or accept for disposal in this State, any solid
or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of this
State. This section shall not apply to:
1. Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey;
2. [any separated waste material destined for a waste recycling facility];
3. Municipal solid waste to be separated or processed into usable secondary materials, including fuel and heat, at a resource recovery facility ...
4. Pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical waste. . . which is to be treated, processed
or recovered in a solid waste disposal facility which is registered with the Department
for such treatment, processing or recovery, other than disposal on or in the lands
of this
state.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:1-4.2 (Supp. 1979).

October 1983]

HAZ4RDOUS WASTE IMPORTS

The legislature stated that the purpose of the Act was to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare from the dangers created by the treatment and disposal in New Jersey of wastes that had been generated in
other states. 4' New Jersey was also experiencing difficulties in locating
adequate landfill space for its own wastes.
City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey
The City of Philadelphia, which had contracts with New Jersey landfill
operators for the disposal of large quantities of Philadelphia wastes,42
sued New Jersey challenging the validity of the waste import restrictions.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the statute.43 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the New Jersey law
unconstitutionally violated the commerce clause.'
The reasoning employed by the Court in City of Philadelphiav. New
Jersey indicated that it will be difficult for states to design waste import
laws that will pass constitutional muster. The commerce clause is not
only an authorization for the Congress to regulate commerce between the
states but also a restriction on state regulation of such commerce.45 The
Supreme Court has used this latter restriction repeatedly to strike down
state regulations impeding interstate commerce. 46 State regulation in a
particular field may be either explicitly or implicitly preempted by
Congressional action . 41 In fields where Congress has abstained from reg41. The Legislature finds and determines that since the enactment of [§ 13:1I-1 to -8] the
volume of solid and liquid waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment and
disposal of these wastes continues to pose an even greater threat to the quality of the
environment of New Jersey, that the available and appropriate land fill sites within the
State are being diminished, that the pnvironment continues to be threatened by the
treatment and disposal of waste which originated or was collected outside the State,
and that the public health, safety and welfare require that the treatment and disposal
within this State of all wastes generated outside of the State be prohibited.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-9 (West 1979).
42. See City of Philadelphia v. State, No. L.-15068 P.W. (Super. Ct. N.J. Mar. 25, 1975);
Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 127 N.J. Super. 160,
316 A.2d 711 (1974).
43. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that "substances injurious to the public health"
were not "articles of commerce" within the meaning of the commerce clause, 68 N.J. 451, 467,
348 A.2d 505, 513 (1975), and were therefore subject to quarantines. See notes 60-63 & accompanying text infra. The court also found that the statute was designed to preserve the environment,
a valid use of the police power, and that the effect on interstate commerce was slight. 68 N.J. at
472-78, 348 A.2d at 516-19.
44. 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented. See
Dister & Schlesinger, State Waste Embargoes Violate the Commerce Clause: City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 8 ECOLOGY L. Q. 371 (1979).
45. Chief Justice Marshall understood the clause to prohibit any state regulation of interstate
commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 92 (1824). Later readers interpreted the
clause as permitting state regulation until superceeded by congressional measures. See The License
Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 590 (1847).
46. But see Cooley v. Board of Wardens 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (in upholding state
regulations which had minimal affect on interstate commerce, the Court said states are free to regulate
those aspects of interstate commerce so local in nature as to demand diverse treatment).
47. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 543-44 (1949).
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ulating an aspect of interstate commerce, however, such as in the field
of hazardous wastes, 48 state regulation is permissible even though it imposes burdens on interstate commerce, provided the state regulation passes
certain tests. 49 Generally these tests have two elements: (1) the state statute
must be evenhanded in that it applies to residents and nonresidents in a
nondiscriminatory fashion; and (2) the statute must serve a valid local
purpose and not merely isolate the state economy or further protectionist
interests.5 ° In cases where the statute is evenhanded, and particularly in
matters concerning the environment,5 the Court has been liberal in granting states authority to impose regulations resulting in substantial burdens
on interstate commerce.5 Where the statute is discriminatory, however,
little room has been given for state regulation. "[W]here simple economic
protectionism is effected by 5state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of
3
invalidity has been erected."
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court refused to
accept the New Jersey Legislature's assertion54 that its primary purpose
was to protect public health and safety as an accurate characterization of
the state's intent." Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart reasoned that
because the New Jersey law imposed the full burden of conserving the
state's remaining landfill space upon out-of-state commercial interests, it
was clearly protectionist legislation of the kind prohibited by the com48. The Court, in discussing the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976) said,
"we find no 'clear and manifest purpose of Congress' [citations omitted] to preempt the entire field
of interstate waste management or transportation, either by express statutory command [citations
omitted], or by implicit legislative design ..."437 U.S. 617, 620 n.4 (1978).
49. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
[W]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. . . .If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
50. Id.
51. For a more detailed discussion of the development of the commerce clause as applied to state
environmental statutes see Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce
Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762 (1974).
52. E.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). The Supreme Court
upheld a local ordinance controlling smoke emissions from vessels carrying out interstate and foreign
trade on the Detroit River. The ordinance effectively prohibited use of certain boilers previously
allowed by the federal government and resulted in substantial costs to shippers. This local burden
on interstate commerce was allowed because it was evenhanded and effectuated a valid local purpose.
53. 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
54. See note 41 supra.
55. The Court declined to resolve the question of ultimate legislative purpose, remarking that the
evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends. "But whatever New
Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce
coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them
differently." 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
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merce clause.5 6 Relying upon previous decisions that had prohibited "anticompetitive" legislation57 and those that had overturned measures giving
state citizens preferred access to natural resources located within the
state," the Court found that New Jersey had attempted to isolate itself
from a problem common to many states by erecting unconstitutional
barriers against interstate trade.' 9
The Court acknowledged that it has upheld protectionist, discriminatory
regulations such as quarantines and other health protective measures."
The Court distinguished its support for quarantines, however, by reasoning that the very movement of contagions such as diseased livestock
across state borders endangered public health. Therefore, although the
statutes had an indirect effect on out-of-state business, their incidental
burden on interstate commerce was constitutional because they served a
legitimate local purpose in protecting public health. 6
Thus, the decision holds, in effect, that it is constitutional for a state
to prohibit the movement of articles into a state where such movement
is adverse to its interest in protecting public health. It is unconstitutional,
56. "The New Jersey law at issue in this case falls squarely within the area that the Commerce
Clause puts off limits to state regulation." 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
57. 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)(citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1934); Foster
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928)). See also H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336
U.S. 525 (1949).
58. 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (citing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1910)).
59. 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
60. Quarantines violate the generally applied commerce clause tests. They are clearly discriminatory, applying only to goods attempting to enter the state from beyond its borders. They may also
serve to protect economic interests, the economic interest in livestock for example, as well as public
health. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1907); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902). The protection
has even been extended to such non-health matters as consumer fraud. Plumley v. Massachusetts,
155 U.S. 461 (1894).
The Court noted in Reid that a state quarantine statute prohibiting the importation of diseased
cattle was not discriminatory because Colorado citizens as well as citizens of other states were
equally constrained in importing the prohibited article. 187 U.S. at 152. Compare this reasoning to
that applied in Philadelphia which focuses the analysis of discrimination on the articles of commerce
rather than on the identity of the importer. It should also be noted that the original plaintiff in City
of Philadelphia included both Pennsylvania and New Jersey residents. See note 42 supra.
61. The quarantine cases themselves do not rest on a public health protection rationale. That
interpretation has apparently been provided by the Court in reaching the Philadelphiadecision. The
quarantine cases themselves rest instead on a recognition of a state's right to exercise the police
power evenhandedly against citizens and non-citizens alike to effectuate a local interest not proscribed
by act of Congress. See e.g., Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 254-56 (1908); Reid v. Colorado,
187 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1902).
The reasoning of the quarantine decisions sounds remarkably similar to that employed in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The reaffirmation of the quarantine decisions in the context
of Philadelphia is consistent with the test of constitutionality outlined in Pike. It thus becomes
reasonable to inquire whether Pike now demands an "evenhanded" statute before employing the
balancing test. The Court avoids the issue by seizing on a distinction between the dangers of
transporting a hazardous article and those involved in its disposal. See infra text accompanying note
63.
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however, for a state to prohibit the disposal of those materials even if
such disposal poses similar risks to health and safety.6 2
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, seized
upon this apparent inconsistency in the application of the commerce
clause. He contended that the majority strained the commerce clause by
distinguishing between the dangers involved in transporting a material
and the equally grave hazard it represents once placed in a landfill. Justice
Rehnquist found the quarantine cases dispositive of the City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey dispute:
I do not see why a State may ban the importation of items whose
movement risks contagion, but cannot ban the importation of items
which, although they may be transported into the State without undue
hazard, will then simply pile up in an ever increasing danger to the
public's health and safety. The Commerce Clause was not drawn
with a view to having the validity of state laws turn on such pointless
distinctions.63
Thus, while the minority's view may reflect a more pragmatic understanding of the dangers inherent in the hazardous waste disposal industry,
the Court has clearly reiterated the unconstitutionality of state hazardous
waste regulations which discriminate against out-of-state wastes or are
motivated by protectionism.
Since City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, lower federal courts have
overturned attempts by states to control hazardous waste imports on several occasions. In Hardagev. Atkins,' 4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that an Oklahoma law prohibiting the importation of hazardous wastes from other states (unless the exporting state
had hazardous waste regulations similar to those in effect in Oklahoma)
was an unconstitutional attempt to force its own legislation on other states
62. The majority asserts, correctly, that the primary dangers in hazardous waste management
arise in the disposal rather than the mere movement of wastes, but the distinction begs the question.
The recognition of a state's right to impose quarantines upon such articles as diseased livestock
arose in light of a realization that their very presence in the channels of commerce endangered public
health. The quarantine statutes constitutionally mitigated this specific threat. With hazardous waste,
the public health threat arises at a different point in commerce, primarily at disposal. The New
Jersey statute attempts to mitigate this specific health risk by limiting the exposure of New Jersey
residents to ever larger quantities of wastes in local landfills. The majority's decision in City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey rests squarely upon a purely legal distinction drawn between these two
sets of circumstances: the hazard of transportation versus the hazard of disposal.
63. 437 U.S. 617,632-33 (1978) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Justice Rehnquist cites no independent
authority for his view. He points out that quarantine laws have been permitted in spite of the fact
that they were directed against out-of-state commerce. Noting that the majority's distinction between
the quarantine cases and the present case was "unconvincing" he said, "Solid waste which is a.
health hazard when it reaches its destination may in all likelihood be an equally great health hazard
in transit." Id. at 632.
64. 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd on rehearing, 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980).
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under the threat of a protectionist ban on waste imports.65 In Washington
State Building & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, 66 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington found that a
public initiative to ban the importation of radioactive wastes into the state
violated the commerce clause because the initiative discriminated on its
face against commerce on the basis of its origin. The court noted that
such facial discrimination could, regardless of the state's purpose, be
sufficient basis to invalidate the statute. 6 '
More recently, in Illinois v. GeneralElectric Co., 68 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit barred enforcement of an Illinois statute 69 which
prohibited the importation of spent nuclear fuel for storage at the only
operating commercial spent fuel storage site in the United States.70 The
statute did not prohibit transportation or the storage of spent fuel from
Illinois reactors. The court held that City of Philadelphia,rather than the
quarantine cases, governed because the state's hostility was not directed
toward spent nuclear fuel itself, but only toward fuel originating outside
the state. 7' The statute was therefore discriminatory and violated the
commerce clause.72
States' Power to Restrict Imports after City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey
The power of states to enforce quarantines upon the transportation of
wastes into the state has theoretically been left intact by the City of
Philadelphiadecision, provided the state is able to distinguish between
probable harms arising from an out-of-state waste shipment as opposed
to those arising from wastes generated and moved solely within the state.73
65. The court also relied on Great Atlantic & Pacific-Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 36 6"
(1976) (Mississippi statute excluding milk imports from another state unless that state accepted
Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis is unconstitutional).
66. 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
67. Id.
68. 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
69. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 111 1/2, § 230.1-24 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). The statute provides
that "[n]o person may dispose of, store, or accept any spent nuclear fuel which was used in any
power generating facility located outside this State, or transport into this State for disposal or storage
any spent nuclear fuel which was used in any power generating facility located outside this State."
Id. at §230.22.
70. 683 F.2d at 208
71. Id. at 214.
72. Id. The court also held that the Illinois statute was preempted by the pervasive regulatory
scheme embodied in the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, which provided for a federal license
for the operation of the storage facility. 683 F.2d at 215. See also Browing-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne
Arundel Cty., 438 A.2d 269 (Md. Ct. App. 1981)(municipal ordinance restricting transportation and
disposal of hazardous waste generated extraterritorially voided under per se rule).
73. "[The quarantine laws] did not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply
prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin." 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). See notes
60, 61, supra.
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As a practical matter, however, traditional import restrictions comprehensive enough to be effective will be barred by the commerce clause.
A state must be able to overcome the difficult hurdle of establishing a
qualitative difference between imported and domestic wastes, and be able
to demonstrate an additional public hazard as a result of that difference."

Moreover, state restrictions on transportation of hazardous materials is
further restricted by federal statute. Congress has granted the Secretary
of Transportation authority to regulate the transportation of hazardous
materials under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975.75
This statute preempts all state and local regulations which are inconsistent
with federal statute or regulations.76 A state may, however, apply to the
Secretary of Transportation for authority to enforce a regulation affording
a greater level of protection, as long as that regulation "does not unreasonably burden commerce." 77 The Supreme Court has not as yet had

occasion to decide whether an exclusionary-type state control regulation
could survive an attack under the statute as unreasonably burdensome to
commerce. 78
States will not succeed in limiting hazardous waste imports under a
New Jersey-type prohibition based upon health and safety. Such attempts
are construed as fostering economic isolation rather than as attempts to
reduce the threat to public health and safety arising out of the rapid
74. Whether a state could impose quarantines on the disposal of wastes rather than the transportation of such materials is a closer question. Provided a state relied on qualitative differences
between domestic and imported wastes, rather than on quantitative differences as New Jersey attempted, some ground for a quarantine argument could perhaps be identified. With the exception of
a limited number of waste streams, however, involving small quantities of material, the hazardous
wastes of concern are reasonably homogeneous from state to state. It would be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, for a state to prove that there were qualitative differences between the probable
harms produced by imported wastes as opposed to those generated within the state. Making the
required distinctions would pose a virtually insurmountable technical and legal obstacle. Moreover,
even should a state be successful in limiting the import of certain, carefully defined waste streams
under the quarantine exception recognized by the Supreme Court, such a limitation would have to
be quite specific and narrow. As a practical matter, therefore, the quarantine-based restrictions would
have little consequence when viewed in the context of a nine million ton per year off-site hazardous
waste disposal industry. Consequently, the quarantine theory is not a fruitful avenue for further
exploration.
75. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976).
76. Id. § 1811(a). In City of New York v. Department of Transportation, 539 F. Supp. 1237
(S.D.N.Y 1982), the court held that the state statute need not impose a greater burden than its federal
counterpart to be preempted, it need only be inconsistent. Section 3003 of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6923, gives EPA the responsibility for promulgating hazardous waste
transportation standards, not to conflict with those of the Department of Transportation under the
HMTA, but to create a uniform manifest system. EPA's regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 263, were published
February 20, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 39, 12722 (1980) and amended on December 31, 1980. 45 Fed.
Reg. 252, 86966 (1980). EPA incorporated DOT's rules by reference. 40 C.F.R. § 263.10 (1980).
77. Id. § 1811(b)(2).
78. See also Comment, Hazardous Waste at the Crossroads: Federal and State Transit Rules
Confront Legal Roadblocks, 12 ENVTL.L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10075 (1982).
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depletion of suitable hazardous waste disposal capacity. The quarantine
alternative apparently left open by the courts is not a practical substitute.7 9
OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR CONTROLLING
INTERSTATE HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL
The Exclusionary Compact
Congress has the authority to regulate interstate commerce, and, therefore, may authorize the states to form binding agreements which restrict
the flow of commerce in interstate transactions. 8" Under the color of the
compact clause of the Constitution, 8 such authority is usually granted
on a case-by-case basis through the passage of a joint resolution or act
of Congress approving the terms of a specific interstate agreement.8" Such
authority may also be conveyed to the states through the passage of generic
authorization to create compacts or agreements covering a given subject
matter. 83 Recent "consent-in-advance" statutes, however, have stipulated
that any agreement or compact developed under the statute must receive
the consent of Congress before it becomes binding. Therefore, the original
statute is merely an invitation to the states to begin the process of negotiation and agreement that precedes the formation of a binding compact.'
Congress has invited the states to negotiate and execute binding agreements or compacts with respect to the management of hazardous wastes.
In the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 85 amended by the Resource Conservation
79. See Note, The Commerce Clause and Interstate Waste Disposal: New Jersey's Options After
the PhiladelphiaDecision, II RUT. CAM. L. J. 31 (1979) (rejecting taxes and municipal ordinances
in favor of unspecified regional co-operation).
80. Congress may authorize the states individually to exercise constraints on interstate commerce
that would otherwise violate the commerce clause if Congress finds it in the national interest to do
so. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 542 (1949). Earlier, the Court had held that
the power of Congress to regulate commerce could be exercised without reference to coordinated
action of the states. But the Court also noted that Congress could, at its discretion, exercise its
power in conjunction with coordinated state action. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408, 434 (1946).
enter
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, "No State shall, without the consent of Congress.
into any Agreement or Compact with another State or a foreign power."
Congressional consent is required whenever a state enters into an agreement with another state
that tends to "the increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere
with the just supremacy of the United States." United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978).
82. E.g., The Colorado River Compact, 43 U.S.C. § 6171 (1976); the New York Port Authority
Compact, Pub. Res. No. 67-17, 42 Stat. 174 (1921).
83. E.g., Airport Development Compacts, 49 U.S.C. § 1743 (1976); Crime Control Compacts,
4 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
84. For a full discussion of the history and uses of interstate compacts, see F. ZIMMERMAN &
M. WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925 (1951).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976) as amended by Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796 (originally enacted as Solid Waste Disposal Act, tit. 11,
§201, 79 Stat. 997). The entire amended Act may also be cited as the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 1, 90 Stat. 2795.
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and Recovery Act of 1976,86 Congress authorized states to develop compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in hazardous waste
management and related law enforcement. 87 No such agreement is binding
upon the affected states, however, unless all parties to the compact have
accepted its terms and it has been approved by the Administrator of the
EPA and the Congress.88 So far, no compacts have been executed under
this provision of the federal hazardous waste law.
A more recent example of such an authorization to the states is found
in the passage of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act,89 which
encourages the states to develop restrictive agreements covering low-level
radioactive waste materials in interstate commerce. Unlike the similar
provisions in the Solid Waste Act," this legislation was actively sought
by the states. 9' It provides that states may: (1) execute regional agreements
or compacts governing the disposal of low-level nuclear waste within the
region; (2) agree upon the location of a low-level nuclear waste site within
one or more states within the region; and, (3) after obtaining the consent
of Congress, exclude low-level 9wastes
generated outside the region from
2
disposal at the regional facility.
86. See Id.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 6904(b)(l976).
Consent of Congress to Compacts-The consent of the Congress is hereby given to
two or more States to negotiate and enter into agreements or compacts, not in conflict
with any law or treaty of the United States, for(1) cooperative effort and mutual assistance for the management of solid waste or
hazardous waste (or both) and the enforcement of their representative laws relating
thereto, and
(2) the establishment of such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such agreements or compacts.
No such agreement or compact shall be binding or obligatory upon any State a party
thereto unless it is agreed upon by all parties to the agreement and until it has been
approved by the Administrator and the Congress.
88. Id.
89. Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §2021b).
90. 42 U.S.C. §6904(b) (1976).
91. See, e.g., National Governors' Association, Policy Positions 1979 (1979).
92. Pub. L. No. 96-573, §4(a)(l)
It is the policy of the Federal Government that(A) each State is responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either
within or outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated
within its borders ...
(2)(A) To carry out the policy set forth in paragraph (1), the States may enter into
such compacts as may be necessary to provide for the establishment and operation
of regional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste.
.(B) A compact entered into under subparagraph (A) shall not take effect until the
Congress has by law consented to the compact. . . . After January 1, 1986, any
such compact may restrict the use of the regional disposal facilities under the compact
to the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within the region.
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Such legislation, at least with respect to low-level radioactive wastes,
provides a legal framework for establishing restrictive importation agreements among states. Since the passage of the Act, five agreements have
been reached.93 Others are expected before the January, 1986 deadline
established by the Act.' The absence of analogous state compacts under
the Solid Waste Disposal Act is attributable to several factors. Part of the
answer lies in the character of the waste stream itself. Radioactive wastes
are generated in small volumes, and they are expensive to manage because
they demand sites with high development and licensing costs. Transportation costs, however, are small because of the small volume of material
involved. Thus, the total waste stream can be handled at a few sites
located throughout the country. 95 Hazardous chemical wastes, on the other
hand, are generated in volumes several orders of magnitude greater than
those which must be handled in the low-level radioactive waste system,
and large quantities are generated in each state. Consequently, with the
exception of a few low-volume, extremely hazardous materials, most of
the economic factors which make regional management attractive for
radioactive wastes do not apply to the hazardous chemical waste problem.
From an economic point of view, it is therefore more desirable to have
sites in each state handling the waste generated by that state's industry.
When the regulatory environment governing hazardous waste disposal
was more relaxed, sites of one sort or another were available in nearly
every state. Only recently, with the emergence of stricter regulatory
standards' and successful public opposition to siting, 97 has the problem
of finding disposal sites begun to appear. 98 Waste generators may be forced
to resort to long distance transport of waste materials, largely as a result
of the regulatory environment or public opposition to local sites rather
than the demands of economic efficiency. In the context of nuclear waste,
the economic factors provide an incentive for regional cooperation and
93. Omang, States Are Juggling A-Waste Disposal Like Hot, ah, Potato, The Washington Post,
March 2, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
94. Id.
95. At present, there are only three commercial low-level nuclear waste sites operating in the
United States: Barnwell, South Carolina; Hanford, Washington; and Beatty, Neviada. Even under a
fully implemented regional compact program, it is anticipated that only six to eight sites will be
needed throughout the United States. A larger number would not be cost effective. Task Force on
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal of the National Governors' Association, Low-Level Waste:
A Program for Action (1980).
96. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6987 (1976),
established standards for the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes. Technical standards for
hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities are authorized under § 6924 and have been promulgated by the EPA as 40 C.F.R. §§264-65 (1982).
97. See Davis, supra note 26.
98. Id.
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a limited number of sites whereas in the context of hazardous waste, the
economic incentives tend to favor the development of more sites in each
state serving a local market.
In such an environment, exclusionary compacts are unlikely to receive
much attention. It is doubtful that a state wishing to limit its hazardous
waste imports would find surrounding, exporting states eager to enter
into agreements which would force those exporting states to cease outof-state disposal. Those states that are major exporters today are in that
situation largely because they have been unable to establish the necessary,
and economically desirable, in-state sites. Foreclosing waste exports from
those states would, in the absence of alternative capacity within the
exporting state, adversely affect that state's industrial economy. Under
such circumstances, state officials are unlikely to find it in their interests
to enter into restrictive or exclusionary compacts with surrounding states
which possess disposal facilities.
Apart from the economic deterrents for regional compacts in hazardous
waste, the lack of interest in such agreements expressed by state officials
to date also stems in some measure from a generalized prejudice against
restrictions in interstate commerce. State officials initially opposed restrictions on the traffic in low-level radioactive wastes. 99 Only when
governors of the three waste site states threatened to close the sites, did
exporting states agree to begin to accept some of the disposal burden and
endorse the compact system."°
The current hazardous waste disposal situation is somewhat analogous
to the nuclear waste situation prior to 1978. There are sites available for
wastes, though at an unnecessarily high cost, and figures regarding the
approaching capacity deficit are too recent to have had a substantial effect
on state policymakers. If local and state governments follow the lowlevel nuclear waste experience model, interest in compacts will increase
as the alternatives for disposal become more limited.
Exclusionary compacts do, therefore, provide a legal option for states
seeking to limit hazardous waste imports. By their nature, import restrictions under compacts would probably involve an exchange of risks and
benefits between participating states. It is clear that under a compact,
states could agree to accept certain classes of wastes for disposal in
99. The author was Special Assistant to the Governor of Michigan from 1975-80 and participated
in numerous multistate task force and committee meetings on the subject of low-level nuclear waste
disposal policy. Many of the views expressed in this section are the result of that experience.
100. Interview with David Reid, Executive Assistant to the Governor of South Carolina, in
Columbia, S.C. (Jan. 30, 1981). This view, while perhaps somewhat biased by the fact that South
Carolina was one of the low-level nuclear waste site states threatening closure, is supported by staff
of the National Govemors'Association. Interview with Holmes Brown, Energy and Natural Resources
Program, National Governors' Association in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 21, 1981).
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exchange for the right to export other wastes to sites in surrounding states.
This intracompact exchange of wastes, over reasonable distances, could
result in a cost-effective and risk-equitable disposal system. It is equally
clear, however, that the advantages of such exchanges have not been
explored: in the five years since the Congressional invitation to develop
interstate hazardous waste compacts was issued, none have been approved
by the Congress. "0l
Unlike the New Jersey model discussed previously or South Dakota
model which follows, the barriers to import restrictions under compacts
are primarily political and economic rather than constitutional. Until such
time as site capacity deficits and the resulting need to transport wastes
over long distances becomes much more expensive, compacts will not
be actively explored.° 2 Because states with sites and those without must
find common interests, negotiate an agreement, and then survive a difficult
Congressional ratification process, the compact's utility as a practical
device to restrict hazardous waste imports is probably limited in the near
term.
The State Ownership Model
The traditional commerce clause analysis, such as was used by the
Court in City of Philadelphia,involves a three step analysis: 1) whether
the subject of the state regulation is an article of commerce, 2) whether
the state restriction poses an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, and 3) whether Congress has granted the states permission to
impose regulations which would otherwise violate the clause.' 03 In City
of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court applied this traditional analysis and
held that a state is without the power to prevent privately owned articles
of trade from being shipped to and disposed of in the state on the ground
that the state wishes to isolate itself from the national economy or because
the goods are needed by the people of the state. " The Court carefully
101. Nor are any such agreements awaiting Congressional ratification.
102. To date, exclusionary measures have been actively opposed by such national state organizations as the National Governors' Association, while they remain neutral with respect to the desirability of developing compacts. See Subcommittee on the Environment of the National Governors'
Association, Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities 10 (1981).
103. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. 2456 (1982); Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
104. 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). In Philadelphia, the Court, without explanation, found that a
landfill was a similar natural resource. Id. This is remarkable in two ways: First, unlike previous
natural resource hoarding cases, New Jersey was not attempting to halt the export of any article of
commerce. Rather, it was attempting to control the use, albeit selectively, of land within the borders
of the state. Holes in the earth have apparently achieved the status of articles of commerce. Second,
there is nothing "natural" about a landfill. Modem landfills are closely regulated, extensively
engineered facilities involving substantial capital investments. Waste treatment facilities involving
chemical neutralization or incineration are even more distantly removed from any common sense
definition of "natural resource." See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264-67 (1981).
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distinguished, however, between a state's attempt to regulate interstate
transactions in privately owned goods, and the state's power to restrict
out-of-state access to state-owned resources where the state is acting as
a market participant. 1 5 In fact, the Court expressly noted that it was not
deciding the latter question in the context of the City of Philadelphiav.
New Jersey opinion. 06
'
Once the determination is made that the state is participating in the
marketplace as a market participant, rather than simply regulating the
private marketplace, the commerce clause analysis becomes irrelevant. 107
In such a case, there is only one determination to be made: is the challenged program "direct state participation in the market."'0 8 In Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, ' a case involving a cement plant owned and operated by
the State of South Dakota, the Court affirmed its reasoning in an earlier
decision" 0 and held in very broad terms that nothing in the commerce
clause prohibits a state from participating in the marketplace, and in so
doing exercising the right to favor its own citizens."'
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake and Its Progeny
The facts in Reeves have interesting parallels to those found in more
recent disputes involving hazardous waste disposal capacity shortages.
In 1919, the State of South Dakota built a cement plant to supply cement
for construction projects in the state during a period of cement shortage.
Between 1919 and the late 1970s, the production of the plant exceeded
the state's own demands, and much of the excess production was sold
to out-of-state buyers. In 1978, a national cement shortage again devel105. Id. See also Note, A State Acting in a Proprietary Capacity as an Interstate Seller Is Not
Restricted by the Commerce Clause and May Therefore Reserve its Products for Its Own Citizens,
13 GA. L. REV. 1086 (1979).
106. Id. at n.6. "We express no opinion about New Jersey's power, consistent with the Commerce
Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state owned resources [citations omitted] or New
Jersey's power to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents and businesses..."
107. White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983).
108. 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980).
109. 447 U.S. 429 (1980)
110. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)
111. 447 U.S. 429, 436-39. The majority in Reeves quickly dismissed Reeves' arguments by
stating, "The basic distinction .. . between States as market participants and States as market
regulators makes good sense and sound law." Id. at 436. The Court similarly dismissed Reeves'
detrimental reliance argument by noting that such a holding would seriously interfere with a State's
ability to "structure relations exclusively with its own citizens." Id. at 441. The potential issue of
resource hoarding, previously rejected by the Court as an unconstitutional exercise of state regulatory
power, was avoided by declaring cement an "end-product" rather than a natural resource. See note
45 infra. An attack based upon "economic protectionism" was deflected with the Court's note that
"The State's refusal to sell to [out-of-state buyers] is protectionist only in the sense that it limits
benefits generated by a state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was
created to serve." 447 U.S. at 442. For a further discussion of the Reeves decision, see 16 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 85 (1981).
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oped. The state-owned facility refused to sell to out-of-state customers
in light of domestic demands which were consuming the plant's entire
production. A former Wyoming-based buyer sued, claiming South Dakota
had violated
the commerce clause by restricting its sales to in-state cus2
tomers.1
The essential difference distinguishing the facts of this case from the
protectionist practices complained of in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, according to the Court, was that South Dakota owned the facility in
question and sold its product in the marketplace as a market participant." 3
Historically, the commerce clause was intended to limit state taxes and
regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace." 4 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, said
there was "no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of
the States themselves to operate freely in the free market."" 5 Further,
this freedom of the state to enter the marketplace, in favor of its own
citizens, exists even though by so doing it may impose substantial burdens
upon the free flow of interstate commerce." 6
The Reeves decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's earlier
holding in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp."7 in which a Virginia scrap
metal dealer sued the State of Maryland over a legislatively enacted
"bounty" program creating financial incentives for the recovery and reclamation of abandoned automobiles. The bounty program offered cash
incentives to scrap metal dealers who accepted the abandoned automobiles
as part of a Maryland effort to eliminate the eyesore created by abandoned
cars. Although state subsidies were offered to scrap dealers on terms
112. 447 U.S. 429, 430-34 (1980).
113. There are several grounds for the distinction. The most significant is the requirement that
courts consider the issue of state sovereignty and the "subtle, complex politically charged" nature
of assessments which will evade traditional commerce clause analysis. Id. at 439. Thus, the Court
concludes, Congress is better suited to the adjustment of interests in such cases. Id.
For an alarmist view of this decision, see Note, Concrete Development Chips Away at Commerce
Clause Analysis, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 629 (1981).
114. 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980).
115. Id.
116. What is remarkable about the Reeves decision is that it was the first to ignore the tests
generally applied to commerce clause questions. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970),
and the test therein, is never discussed. Once a state is found to be behaving as a private market
participant, the precedent found in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), is
applied, and the extent to which a state action burdens interstate commerce is irrelevant. This analysis
was confirmed in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 103 S. Ct. 1042
(1983). The more difficult question is to define the breadth of the umbrella created by state market
participation. Construction Employers broadened the scope of the state power to include not only
the state's freedom to deal or not to deal with whomever the state chose, but the power to require
that the state's private customers also deal only with those whom the state found acceptable. This
expansion of Alexandria Scrap and Reeves was severely criticized in the dissent by Justice Blackmun.
103 S. Ct. 1049 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
117. 426 U.S. 794, 814 (1976).
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which virtually excluded out-of-state dealers from participating in the
program, the Court concluded that such discrimination did not violate
the commerce clause. The Court stated that in the absence of a Congressional prohibition there was nothing in the purposes animating the commerce clause which would forbid a state from participating in the private
marketplace or electing to favor its own citizens over those of other
states. "'
Viewed another way, the Court has refused to single out state enterprises
for special consideration under the commerce clause when they choose
to act as private market participants. The state government's ability to
produce its own supplies and to deal with whom it pleases when engaged
in the private marketplace is not, as a Constitutional matter, distinguished
from that of private individuals and businesses." 9
The distinction between the state as a private market regulator and the
state as a market participant has been reaffirmed and expanded by the
Court in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers. 120
In ConstructionEmployers, the Court held that a mayor's executive order
requiring all construction -projects funded by city money be performed
by a work force at least half of whom were city residents was not violative
of the commerce clause. The Court wrote that Alexandria Scrap and
Reeves "stand for the proposition that when a state or local government
enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the restraints of the
commerce clause. ".2 Once the state is a market participant, there are no
barriers to the conditions which it may impose upon those with whom it
does business.' 22 Indeed, these restrictions may have effects which reach
beyond the parties directly involved in the transaction.123
State market participation is apparently rare, and the instances of state
action which provokes a commerce clause suit are limited. 24 As the
118. Id. at 810.
119. Id.
120. 103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983).
121. Id. at 1044.
122. Id. at 1046. Note that as a market participant, the effect of the state's conditions on out-ofstate residents is irrelevant. Such an analysis would only be material to a commerce clause analysis
which is inapplicable here. Id.
123. "[Wie think the Commerce Clause does not require the city to stop at the boundry of formal
privity of contract." Id., n.7.
124. Aside from Alexandria Scrap, Reeves and Construction Employers, the only other instance
was a Connecticut home mortgage program. Fidelity Guarantee Mortgage Corp. v. Connecticut
Housing Finance Auth., 532 F Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1982) (state funded mortgage guarantee program
could require three years of previous experience in state to participate in program). Contra Tangier
Sound Watermen's Assoc. v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982) (state may not require
residence as prerequisite for crabbing license, state regulation of private commerce not covered by
Reeves); Tenneco v. Sutton, 530 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. La. 1981) (regulating sale of privately owned
natural gas not state market participation so Reeves inapplicable).
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following discussion shows, however, state market participation in hazardous waste facilities would provide a means to control waste imports.
Applying Reeves to Hazardous Waste Site Development
Several states have enacted legislation which authorizes state agencies
to acquire by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, land and facilities
needed for the disposal of hazardous wastes.' 25 In some cases, statutes
actually authorize state agencies to operate these facilities.126 The statutes
generally require the collection of fees from persons disposing of wastes
at these sites and may express a legislative intent that such operations be
'
self-supporting enterprises. 27
State owned and operated hazardous waste facilities would appear to
be constitutionally indistinguishable from the South Dakota cement plant.
The state making such an investment to provide a needed service not
previously available in the marketplace and operating the facility as a
revenue generating entity would be behaving in that marketplace like a
private entrepreneur. As such, under the Supreme Court's decisions, the
state-owned hazardous waste facility would seem to have the freedom to
select its own customers. It could, if it so chose, limit its customers to
those who generated their hazardous wastes within the state. The fact
that such a stipulation would impose a de facto restriction on the flow of
should not change the constitutionality of
wastes in interstate commerce
128
that import control.
Preemption by RCRA-An Issue Avoided
In fields where both the federal and state governments have acted, the
supremacy clause' 29 requires that the state law be preempted under the
following circumstances: 1) where the state law conflicts with federal
statute, 2) where enforcement of the state law would frustrate the federal
scheme, or 3) where the totality of circumstances show Congress intended
125. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2804(A) (West Supp. 1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§3-701-13 (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 155A.06 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. PUB. AUTH.
LAW § 1285-c (McKinney 1982); 1979 OR. LAWS §§459.595, 468.220(h) (1979); VA. CODE
§32.1-178(11) (Michie. Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE §70.105.040 (West Supp. 1983).
126. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2804(A) (West Supp 1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-701-13 (1983); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1285-c (McKinney 1982); VA. CODE § 32.1178(12) (Michie. Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105.040 (West Supp. 1983).
127. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2805 (West Supp 1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§3-711 (1983); VA. CODE §32.1-178(14) (Michie. Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §70.150.040 (West Supp. 1983).
128. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983)
(fact that state order has result of requiring private employment practices otherwise violative of
commerce clause no bar where state acting as private market participant).
129. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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to fully occupy the field. 130 A court reviewing such a case begins with
the assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law,131 then
goes on to assess whether compliance with both state and federal laws
is impossible, 132 the state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishment
of the full Congressional purpose,' 33 or the federal scheme is so pervasive
that it is reasonable to infer that Congress meant to leave no room for
the states.' 34
35
In the case of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),1
it is clear from the face of the statute that Congress had no express intent
to preclude state legislative initiatives in the field. Section 3009136 of the
Act indicates quite the opposite intent. Under the Act, states are simply
prohibited from imposing any requirement less stringent on the trans37
portation or disposal of hazardous waste than that provided by the Act.
There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to prevent states
from imposing more stringent regulation on hazardous waste transportation and disposal. The Supreme Court has expressly reached the same
conclusion, finding no supremacy clause barrier to state imposed regulations on hazardous waste imports.' 38
Having ruled out any express Congressional intent to preempt state
imposed restrictions on waste imports, it would still be possible for a
court to hold that state owned site refusal to accept out-of-state wastes
violated an implied federal preemption. Factors bearing on an implied
preemption include 1) the aim and intent of Congress, 2) pervasiveness
of the federal scheme, 3) whether federal uniformity is vital to the national39
interest, and 4) whether Congressional objectives would be obstructed. 1
The Supreme Court has already held,141 with respect to a statute seeking
130. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746-47 (1981); Matter of Gary Aircraft Corp., 681
F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982) citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
131. 541 U.S. at 746.
132. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
133. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151.
134. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 332 U.S. 318 (1947).
135. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6987 (1976).
136. Id. at§ 6929.
137. Id.
138. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620-21 & n.4 (1978). Even though the
New Jersey statute was held unconstitutional under the commerce clause, see infra text accompanying
notes 42-63, the Court said, "We agree ... that the state law has not been preempted by federal
legislation." Id. at 620. The Court reviewed the federal act and found "no 'clear and manifest
purpose of Congress' [citation
omitted] to preempt the entire field of interstate waste management
or transportation, either by express statutory command [citation omitted] or by implicit legislative
design [citation omitted]. Id. at620 n.4.
139. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (8th Cir. 1971), affd,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
140. City of Philadelphia v.New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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to exercise police powers, 1 4 1 that neither was RCRA pervasive enough
nor was the field it regulated so in need of national uniformity as to
require preemption. 142 Congress clearly did not intend to preclude state
hazardous waste sites. The only remaining question is whether Congressional objectives would be obstructed.
Congress' clear object, which resounds throughout the legislative history of RCRA, was to put an end to the indiscriminate dumping of
hazardous chemicals along roadsides, into rivers and streams, and alongside poorly engineered local dumps. States which provide additional hazardous waste disposal capacity meeting regulatory requirements are
furthering this objective.
State owned waste sites, though they may refuse to accept imported
wastes, should not be preempted by federal statute. The state is not
exercising a police power to restrict imports; therefore, it is doubtful that
any conflict sufficient to bring the supremacy clause to bear could ever
exist. Even if supremacy clause questions were to arise, it is clear that
state action could not produce a conflict with the federal statute significant
enough to overcome the presumed validity of the state law.
Other Limitations
The apparent trend toward allowing states which participate in the free
market to select their customers regardless of the resulting impacts on
interstate commerce does contain several important caveats, and stateowned hazardous waste facilities pursuing de facto import restrictions
under the Reeves decision could still run afoul of the commerce clause
in a number of ways. Each involves uncertainty as to whether a state
operating a hazardous waste site constitutes "direct participation in the
market", which is the only relevant question under the Reeves analysis. 43
First, Reeves was a five to four decision in which the minority argued
forcefully that a state is exempt from the commerce clause only where
it is performing an "integral operation in areas of traditional government
functions.4"' While municipal waste disposal is commonly a governmental operation, hazardous waste disposal may not be considered a
"traditional government function."
Second, the Reeves decision classified the New Jersey landfill restrictions contested in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey together with other
141. All of the recent supremacy clause cases concern instances where the exercise of a state
police power, acting to regulate the private marketplace, conflicts with concurrent federal regulation.
In a case where the state is itself acting in, rather than regulating, the marketplace, it is highly
questionable whether any traditional supremacy clause analysis could be tortured to fit such facts.
142. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
143. See infra text accompanying notes 107-108.
144. 447 U.S. 429, 451-52 (1980).
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decisions finding natural resources hoarding by states unconstitutional." 5
It distinguished the cement plant from the landfill by noting that the
cement factory produces a product at the end of a complex and costly
process involving an expensive physical plant and human labor acting on
raw materials. 46
' It is arguable that hazardous waste disposal also requires
a production process. If this distinction is important, then the extent to
which a state hazardous waste facility processes, neutralizes, or otherwise
treats incoming wastes, could be determinative before the courts. On the
other hand, the importance of the "production process" distinction is
clouded by the fact that the Reeves majority relied heavily on Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., which did not involve a physical plant or a
production process, but simply a state bounty program on abandoned
automobiles. White v. Massachusetts Council of ConstructionEmployers
further clouds the issue in that ConstructionEmployers involved no "production process", but simply hiring practices of contractors engaged for
the construction of city building projects.
Finally, it is unclear whether a state that simply owned a facility, which
it leased or otherwise contracted with another party to operate, would be
considered to be "operating freely in the free market." '47 It is possible
that a state attempting to restrict the customers of a privately operated,
state-owned site would be found to be imposing unconstitutional restrictions on the private pursuit of interstate trade.
Whether a state finds it desirable to participate in the hazardous waste
disposal marketplace depends upon a variety of factors. A state must
assess its potential direct financial risk and possible exposure to liability
as the owner of a high risk facility. In addition, the political climate in
the state and urgency of the need for additional waste disposal capacity
must be evaluated. But it is clear that where a state requires additional
capacity and wishes to conserve this capacity for the use by its own
industry, the Reeves decision provides means to achieve these goals with
145. 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). E.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
221 U.S. 229 (1911) (same). Each of the cases cited by the majority involved a state attempting to
restrict the export of a privately owned natural resource.
146. See also South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139 (D. Alaska
1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1982) (timber is a natural resource and commerce clause analysis
is required regardless of state ownership).
147. In Washington St. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.
Wash. 1981), the court held that where the State of Washington was merely serving as a sublessor
of a tract of federally owned land in the Hanford Military Reservation, the state actually was in the
real estate business, and not a market participant in the radioactive waste business to a degree
sufficient to place state restrictions on the import of radioactive' wastes beyond the reach of the
commerce clause.
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the greatest probability of success in the near future. At the very least,
it is an incentive for states to consider state ownership and operation of
new treatment and disposal facilities.
CONCLUSION
Beginning with the earliest commerce clause decisions, the Supreme
Court set out to promote integrated, efficient national expansion. Therefore, the Court consistently has overruled isolationist or protectionist state
legislation affecting the free flow of interstate commerce. By applying
similar standards to questions involving interstate traffic in hazardous
wastes, however, the Court may be frustrating the achievement of adequate, efficiently sited and utilized hazardous waste disposal capacity
essential to continued national economic progress. In view of the Supreme
Court's decision to treat waste disposal capacity as an article of commerce
or a natural resource not subject to state import regulation, states seeking
the advantages of import restrictions must look elsewhere. Compacts,
although legally sound, are currently fraught with political and economic
difficulties. Thus, state ownership of new facilities may provide the remaining basis for state governments to exercise control over hazardous
waste imports.

